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The Supremacy Clause Requires State Law to Yield
to Federal Law When the State Law Conflicts with
the Federal Law, Intrudes in a Field Traditionally
Regulated by the Federal Government, or Stands as
an Obstacle to Achievement of Federal Goals:
United States v. Locke
- SUPREMACY CLAUSE - VESSEL REGULATION - The
Supreme Court of the United States held that a state may not enact
its own laws regulating oil tankers when a comprehensive federal
regulatory scheme exists, because enforcement of the state statutes
would obstruct achievement of the federal goal of a uniform system of regulation.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

United States v. Locke, 120 S. Ct. 1135 (2000).
The marine transport of large quantities of oil carries with it the
danger of potential environmental catastrophe.' Both Congress and
the State of Washington have passed regulations aimed at reducing
this risk.2 The State of Washington borders on several bodies of
water of national and international importance. 3 Washington is separated from British Columbia, Canada, by the Strait of Juan de
Fuca, which serves as a passage for travel between the Pacific
Ocean and Puget Sound. 4 The Puget Sound area is the site of a
number of oil refineries, 5 and ships from both the United States
6
and foreign countries carry oil to and from Puget Sound. Most of
the ships used to transport oil are tankers, "vessels which consist
of a group of tanks contained in a ship-shaped hull, propelled by an
isolated machinery plant at the stern."7 The size of the vessels used
1. U.S. v. Locke, 120 S. Ct. 1135 (2000).
2. Locke, 120 S. Ct. at 1140.
3. Id. at 1141. Washington borders on the Pacific Ocean, the Columbia River estuary,
Grays Harbor, Wllapa Bay, and Puget Sound. Id.
4. Id. Inbound traffic travels through Washington's waters and outbound traffic uses
Canadian waters. Id.
5. Id. "Refineries and product terminals are located adjacent to Puget Sound in ports
including Cherry Point, Ferndale, Tacoma, and Anacortes. Canadian refineries are found near
Vancouver on Burrard Inlet and the lower Fraser River." Id.
6. Id.
7. Locke, 120 S. Ct. at 1141.
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has increased continually since World War 11.8
The number and size of the tankers used to transport oil present
the risk of oil spills. 9 Indeed, Washington was the site of such a
spill in December, 1984.10 This spill and spills elsewhere "caused
public officials intense concern."" As a result of this concern, officials in Washington created the Office of Marine Safety and
directed that office to devise standards for the prevention of oil
spills. 12 The Office of Marine Safety published regulations 13 governing event reporting, operating procedures, personnel policies,
management, technology, notice of entry, and safety reports, 4 as
5
well as penalties for their violation.
The International Association of Independent Tanker Owners
("Intertanko") brought suit to obtain a declaratory judgment, as
well as an injunction, against the state officials responsible for
enforcing the regulations, arguing that in passing such regulations
the state had interfered in an area traditionally controlled by the
federal government. 16 Intertanko further argued that the state regulations "imposed unique requirements in an area where national
uniformity was mandated," and that the regulations hindered the
federal government's ability to "develop effective international environmental and safety standards." 7 Several environmental groups
intervened to defend the regulations, 8 while thirteen nations dispatched a diplomatic note to the United States, expressing their
concern over the "uncertainty and confusion" that would result
8. Id. During World War H, the average tanker had a capacity of 16,000 deadweight
tons. By 1966, that number had risen to 76,000 deadweight tons. Id.
9.

Id.

10. Id. at 1142. "In December 1984, for example, the tanker ARCO Anchorage grounded
in Port Angeles Harbor and spilled 239,000 gallons of Alaskan crude oil." Id.
11. Id. The Torrey Canyon spilled 120,000 gallons of crude oil near Cornwall, England,
in 1967 and the Exxon Vaidez spilled 11 million gallons of crude oil into Prince William
Sound, Alaska, in 1989. Id. at 1140, 1142.
12. Locke, 120 S. Ct. at 1142.
13.

Id.

14. Id. at 1152-54.
15. Id. at 1142. "[P]ossible sanctions include statutory penalties, restrictions of the vessel's operations in state waters, and a denial of entry into state waters." Id.
16. Id. Intertanko is a trade association whose 305 members own or operate more than
2,000 tankers of both United States and foreign registry. The organization represents approximately 80% of the world's independently owned tanker fleet, and an estimated 60% of the oil
imported into the United States is carried on Intertanko vessels. Id.
17. Locke, 120 S. Ct. at 1142.
18. Id. The National Resources Defense Council, the Washington Environmental Counsel, and Ocean Advocates, Inc., intervened. Int'l Ass'n of Indep. Tanker Owners v. Lowry, 947
E Supp. 1484 (W.D. Wash. 1996).
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from allowing the states and the federal government to have differing regulations.' 9
The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington upheld the state regulations. 20 On appeal, the United States
intervened and argued that the district court "failed to give sufficient weight to the substantial foreign affairs interests of the Federal Government." 21 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit found that Washington Administrative Code section
317-21-265, requiring the installation of navigation and towing
equipment, was identical to a regulation that the United States
Supreme Court declared to be pre-empted by federal law in Ray v.
Atlantic Richfield Co. 22 The court of appeals upheld the other regulations 23 and denied petitions for rehearing en banc. 24 In his dissent,
Judge Graber argued that the majority had reached a conclusion
that gave excessive weight to two clauses in the Oil Pollution Act
of 1990, and that portions of the opinion were "inconsistent with
25
Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent."
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari26 to determine whether the state laws, which were enacted more recently
than the federal laws, could be enforced "despite the comprehensive federal regulatory scheme governing oil tankers." 7 Using the
same statute relied on in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co. 28 as a guide,
the Court determined that some of the Washington regulations were
pre-empted by federal regulations. 29 The Court remanded the case
for a determination regarding the remainder of the regulations at
30
issue.
Justice Kennedy, writing for a unanimous Court, 31 began by noting that Congress has regulated interstate navigation since the
19. Locke, 120 S. Ct. at 1142.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1143.
23. Id. at 1142.
24. Locke, 120 S. Ct. at 1143.
25. Id. The two clauses given "excessive weight" by the court of appeals were the saving clauses found in Title I of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990; these were discussed separately
by the Court. Id. at 1145.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1140-41.
28. 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
29. Locke, 120 S. Ct. at 1141.
30.

Id.

31.

Id. at 1139.
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founding of the United States.3 2 Federal licensing requirements
were enacted to "promote trade and enhance the safety of crew
members and passengers."3 In 1871, Congress enacted regulations
providing for the licensing of certain crewmembers on steampowered ships.34 Since that time, Congress has enacted other statutes pursuant to its regulatory power, several of which formed the
35
basis of the parties' arguments.
The Court briefly discussed the statutes at issue. The Tank Vessel
Act of 193636 was passed "to establish 'a reasonable and uniform
set of rules and regulations concerning . . . vessels carrying the
type of cargo deemed dangerous.'-37 This Act was in effect until
the Torrey Canyon spill in 1967 prompted Congress to pass new
regulations.38 The new regulations took the form of the Ports and
Waterways Safety Act of 1972 ("PWSA'), 39 which was amended by
the Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978. 40 Title I of the PWSA permits the Coast Guard to "enact measures for controlling vessel traffic or for protecting navigation and the marine environment.'"41
Title II requires the Coast Guard to issue those regulations necessary to guard against property damage and to ensure safe naviga42
tion.
The Court noted that the PWSA was amended by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 ("OPA)," which was enacted as a result of the
Exxon Valdez spill." Title I of the OPA imposes liability for an oil
spill. 45 Title I also contains two saving clauses that are important to
Intertanko's argument and the Court discussed these separately.46
32. Id. at 1143.
33. Id.
34. Locke, 120 S. Ct. at 1143.
35. Id.
36. 49 Stat. 1889 (1936) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 46 U.S.C.).
37. Locke, 120 S. Ct. at 1144.
38.

Id.

39. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-36 (1994).
40. Locke, 120 S. Ct. at 1144.
41. Id.
42. Id. The regulations issued by the Coast Guard are to address "the 'design, construction, alteration, repair, maintenance, operation, equipping, personnel qualification, and manning of vessels... that may be necessary for increased protection against hazards to life and
property, for navigation and vessel safety, and for enhanced protection of the marine environment.'" Id.
43. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-61 (1994).
44. Locke, 120 S. Ct. at 1144.
45. Id.
46. Id. A saving clause is "[a] statutory provision exempting from coverage something
that would otherwise be included." BLACK's LAw DicTioNARY 1344 (7th ed. 1999).
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Title IV pertains to the prevention of oil spills and sets forth
requirements for the reporting of accidents and the implementation
4
of preventative measures, such as double hulls on all tankers.
Finally, the Court mentioned the treaties and international agreements applicable to the case. 48 In its brief, the United States argued
that these treaties, which are based on the principle of reciprocity,
pre-empt the state regulations at issue.49 However, the Court
declined to consider the effect of the treaties on the state statutes
in question because those statutes are pre-empted by federal statutes.10 The Court acknowledged that the existence of the treaties is
relevant, 51 and allowed the parties the option of arguing the trea52
ties' effect on the state statutes during proceedings on remand.
Justice Kennedy next indicated the importance of Ray in the
Court's pre-emption analysis. Ray held that several Washington
tanker regulations were pre-empted by the PWSA and Coast Guard
regulations.53 The petitioners in Locke argued that the regulations at
issue were also pre-empted, based on the decision in Ray.M Justice
Kennedy agreed with the petitioners, stating "[t]he Ray Court's
interpretation of the PWSA is correct and controlling." 55 The Court
found that neither the analysis in Ray nor any provisions of the
PWSA had been altered by Congressional action. 56 The court of
appeals, however, had placed special emphasis on the saving
clauses found in the OPA, asserting that they effected "a return of
authority to the States," and Justice Kennedy next turned to a dis57
cussion of those clauses.
The saving clauses relied on by the court of appeals provide that
the OPA does not pre-empt state power to impose requirements
relating to oil spills and that the OPA does not affect state power
47. Locke, 120 S.Ct. at 1144.
48. Id. at 1145.
49. Id. Reciprocity means that "the certification of a vessel by the government of its
own flag nation warrants that the ship has complied with international standards, and vessels with those certificates may enter ports of the signatory nations." Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. "[Tihese agreements give force to the longstanding rule that the enactment of a
uniform federal scheme displaces state law, and the treaties indicate Congress will have
demanded national uniformity regarding maritime commerce." Id.
52. Locke, 120 S.Ct. at 1145.
53. Id. The regulations that were held pre-empted in Ray were "a state pilotage
requirement, Washington's limitation on tanker size, and tanker design and construction
rules." Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Locke, 120 S. Ct. at 1145.
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to impose additional liability for oil spills.8 The Court reasoned
that since the saving clauses were found in Title I of the OPA, "Oil
Pollution Liability and Compensation," they were intended to apply
to matters similar to those regulated under Title 1 . 59 Thus, the
clauses act to preserve state laws regarding liability for oil spills. 60
The language used by Congress in the saving clauses, stated Justice
Kennedy, supports this reasoning. 61 Further, other titles of the OPA
deal with other areas of maritime oil transportation. 62 If Congress
had meant to preserve state regulations in all of those areas, reasoned the Court, then it would not have placed the saving clauses
in Title I.6 The Court held that the clauses do not, therefore, allow
the states to regulate all aspects of tanker operation, but only those
aspects encompassed by the scope of Title 1.64 Justice Kennedy concluded that this interpretation does not upset "the established
65
federal-state balance" in the regulation of maritime commerce.
Next, the Court found that the OPA does not invalidate either the
PWSA or the holding in Ray.66 The Court found support for its
position in the Conference Report on the OPA. 67 Justice Kennedy
58. Id. at 1145-46. The first saving clause reads:
(a) Preservation of State authorities... Nothing in this Act or the Act of March 3, 1851
shall (1) affect, or be construed or interpreted as pre-empting, the authority of any State or
political subdivision thereof from imposing any additional liability or requirements
with respect to - (A) the discharge of oil or other pollution by oil within such
State ....
Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 2718 (1994)). The second clause reads:
(b) Additional requirements and liabilities; penalties. Nothing in this Act, the Act of
March 3, 1851 (46 U.S.C. 183 et seq.), or section 9509 of [the Internal Revenue Code of
1986 (26 U.S.C. 9509)], shall in any way affect, or be construed to affect, the authority
of the United States or any State or political subdivision thereof - (1) to impose additional liability or additional requirements . .. relating to the discharge, or substantial
threat of a discharge, of oil.
Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 2718 (1994)).
59. Id. at 1146.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Locke, 120 S. Ct. at 1146. The other titles of the OPA regulate "licensing and certificates of registry... duties of senior licensed officers to relieve the master... manning standards for foreign vessels ... reporting of marine casualties ... minimum standards for plating thickness . . . tank vessel manning requirements . . . and tank vessel construction
standards." Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1146-47.
65. Id. at 1147.
66. Id.
67. Locke, 120 S. Ct. at 1147. "[Tlhe statute 'does not disturb the Supreme Court's decision in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151.'" Id. (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-653,
at 122 (1990)).
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then turned to an analysis of Ray.68 In Ray, an oil refinery operator
challenged Washington laws regulating oil tankers on grounds that
the state laws were pre-empted by federal regulations. 69 The Court
held that Title I of the PWSA allows states to regulate their own
waters as long as the state regulations are based on the unique
characteristics of local waters.70
Justice Kennedy concluded that, under Ray, states may enforce
their own regulations unless they are in direct conflict with federal
regulations ("conflict pre-emption"). 71 If the Coast Guard has
promulgated regulations in a certain area or has determined that
regulations are not necessary in a certain area, then the states may
not enact their own rules governing those areas. 72 Even with
respect to local waters, federal officials may be better situated than
local officials to determine the types of regulations that are appropriate. 73
The Ray Court also held that states may not regulate matters
governed by Title II of the PWSA. 74 The Washington regulations at
issue in Ray, relating to the design and construction of oil tankers,
were held to be invalid "because they were within a field reserved
for federal regulation." 75 Justice Kennedy affirmed this holding and
added that it applies not only to design and construction, but to all
76
matters that fall within Title II of the PWSA ("field pre-emption").
Both the Ray Court and Justice Kennedy recognized that conflict
pre-emption and field pre-emption may overlap in some cases, but
77
agreed that field pre-emption should not be applied in all cases.
Rather, conflict pre-emption will be more appropriate in some
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1148. Local regulations must be based on "peculiarities of local waters that
call for special precautionary measures." Id. (quoting Ray v. At. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151,
171 (1978)).
71. Id.
72. Locke, 120 S. Ct. at 1148-49.
73. Id. at 1149. "[Elven in the context of a regulation related to local waters, a federal
official with an overview of all possible ramifications of a particular requirement might be in
the best position to balance all the competing interests." Id. (citing Ray v. At. Richfield Co.,
435 U.S. 151, 177 (1978)).
74. Id. "Under Ray's interpretation of the Title 1I PWSA provision now found at 46
U.S.C. § 3703(a), only the Federal Government may regulate the 'design, construction, alteration, repair, maintenance, operation, equipping, personnel qualification, and manning' of
tanker vessels." Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Locke, 120 S. Ct. at 1149.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 39:865

cases.78 The Court stated that in determining when conflict preemption applies, the factors to be considered include whether a
regulation is justified by the existence of unique local conditions,
as well as the "limited extraterritorial effect" of a regulation.7 9 Field
pre-emption applies when a regulation affects tanker activity
outside state waters, requires "adjustment of systemic aspects of
the vessel," or imposes a burden on tanker activity within state
waters.80
In the present case, the Court found that field pre-emption
applied to four of the Washington statutes at issue.8 ' First, Washington Administrative Code section 317-21-230, which requires specific
training for a tanker's officers and crew, is not related to characteristics of local waterways and affects tanker operations outside
Washington waters, and is, therefore, pre-empted by Title II of the
PWSA.8 2 Second, section 317-21-250 requires tanker crews to be
proficient in English.8 This statute is pre-empted by Title II of the
PWSA for the same reasons as the previous section - because it is
not related to characteristics of local waterways and because it
affects tanker operation outside Washington waters. 84 In addition,
Justice Kennedy pointed out that 33 U.S.C. § 1228(a)(7), which provides that vessels operating in United States waters must have "at
least one licensed deck officer on the navigation bridge who is
capable of clearly understanding English," also pre-empts this section."
Third, section 317-21-200 imposes navigation watch requirements
78. Id.
79. Id at 1149-50. The Court concluded:
Useful inquiries include whether the rule is justified by conditions unique to a particular port or waterway... Furthermore, a regulation within the State's residual powers
will often be of limited extraterritorial effect, not requiring the tanker to modify its
primary conduct outside the specific body of water purported to justify the local rule.

Id.
80. Id. at 1150. Justice Kennedy stated:
Local rules not pre-empted under Title II of the PWSA pose a minimal risk of innocent
noncompliance, do not affect vessel operations outside the jurisdiction, do not require
adjustment of systemic aspects of the vessel, and do not impose a substantial burden
on the vessel's operation within the local jurisdiction itself.
Id.
81.
82.

Id.
Locke, 120 S. Ct. at 1150. "[T]raining is a field reserved to the Federal Government."

Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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to be fulfilled at all times and in all of Washington's waters.8 6 Again,
this requirement is not related to local waterway peculiarities and
is, therefore, pre-empted by Title II of the PWSA.8 7 Finally, the
Court held that section 317-21-130 is pre-empted by federal regulations.ss The Washington statute requires vessels traversing its
waters to report marine casualties, regardless of where the casualty
occurred.89 The types of casualties required to be reported include
collisions; allisions; near-misses; accidental or intentional groundings; failure of propulsion, steering, or control systems; incidents
affecting the seaworthiness of a vessel; and oil spills.90
The Court found that Coast Guard reporting requirements were
intended to be the only requirements imposed on vessels.91 The
state regulation is "a significant burden in terms of cost and the
risk of innocent non-compliance," and applies beyond state waters,
"where a State's jurisdiction and authority are most in doubt."92
Thus, this state regulation is pre-empted. 93
With respect to the other regulations in question, the Court
remanded the case and instructed "the Court of Appeals or... the
District Court" to determine the applicability of conflict preemption and field pre-emption, as well as the pre-emptive effect of
other applicable federal regulations. 94 Justice Kennedy recognized
that existing regulations may not provide adequate protection from
the threats posed by the large-scale marine transport of crude oil,
but noted that the adequacy of a uniform regulatory scheme was
not at issue.9 5
In admiralty law, federal statutory law is superior to judge-made
general maritime law; judge-made general maritime law is superior
to conflicting state law.96 State law may supplement federal law, but
86. Id. at 1150-51.
87. Locke, 120 S. Ct. at 1151.
88. Id.
89. Id. The Court stated:
A vessel operator is required by the state regulation to make a detailed report to the
State on each incident, listing the date, location, and weather conditions. The report
must also list the government agencies to whom the event was reported and must
contain a "brief analysis of any known causes" and a "description of measures taken
to prevent a reoccurrence [sic]."
Id.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
Id.
Locke, 120 S. Ct. at 1152.
Id.
Id.
Id.
THoMAs J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 2-5, at 91 (2nd ed. 1994).
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will be preempted where there is a strong federal interest and a
need for uniformity.97 The importance of commerce and the need
for a uniform system of regulation were recognized even before the
ratification of the Constitution, as evidenced by The Federalist
Papers.98 The authors of The Federalist Papers stated that commerce was the largest source of national revenue,9 and that "navigation should be regulated by a system cautiously formed and
steadily pursued." 1°0 They also acknowledged that it was necessary
for the laws of the United States to be "the supreme law of the
land" because otherwise treaties or national laws might have force
in one state but not in another and the effectiveness of the federal
system would be undermined. 10 1
After the ratification of the Constitution, one of the initial actions
of the first Congress was to pass a law providing for registration of
all ships built in the United States or belonging to citizens of the
United States. 10 2 Only those ships registered thereunder were "entitled to the benefits granted by any law of the United States." °3
0 4 the Supreme
Thirty years later, in McCulloch v. Maryland,1
Court was presented with the question of which law controlled
when state law and federal law conflicted. 10 5 The Court based its
opinion on the express language of the Constitution, which states
that the Constitution and laws enacted pursuant to the Constitution
are the supreme law of the land, "any thing in the constitution or
laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." °6 From that language, reasoned the Court, it follows that federal laws control state
laws and not vice versa.10 7 Chief Justice Marshall reasoned that if
the taxing power of the states is allowed to supersede the taxing
power of the federal government, then other powers of the states
97.
98.

Id. at 92-93.
Locke, 120 S. Ct. at 1143.

99.

THE FEDERALIST No. 12 (Alexander Hamilton).

100.
101.

THE FEDERALIST No. 64 (John Jay).
THE FEDERALIST No. 44 (James Madison).

102. Act of Sept. 1, 1789, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 55 (repealed 1792).
103. Id.
104. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
105. Id. at 405. The questions involved in McCuUoch were whether Congress had the
power to incorporate a bank, and whether the State of Maryland had the power, in conformity with the Constitution, to tax that bank. Id. at 401, 425.
106. Id. at 406.
107. Id. at 426. The Court further reasoned that Congressional power to create a bank
implied a Congressional power to preserve that bank, that "a power to destroy, if wielded by
a different hand, is . . . incompatible with the power to create and preserve," and that the
state may exercise its taxing power "so as to destroy" the bank. Id.

2001

United States v. Locke

also will be allowed to supersede comparable powers granted to
the federal government. tu If this were the case, Justice Marshall
concluded, then the statement that the Constitution is the supreme
law of the land would be rendered meaningless. 1°9
The power of the federal government to regulate commerce,
however, is not of the same nature as the power to tax, as the
Supreme Court made clear in Gibbons v. Ogden.110 Gibbons
involved the grant of a federal license to a vessel to engage in the
coasting trade, despite a state law prohibiting steam-powered vessels licensed by the United States from navigating state waters."'
The Court held that commerce includes navigation and, as a result,
Congress may regulate navigation as part of its regulation of commerce.' Chief Justice Marshall based his decision in part on Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution, which prohibits the federal government from giving any preference to ports of one state over
those of another, and which "is expressly applied to commercial
regulations."" 3 He concluded that the inclusion of "navigation"
within "commerce" amounts to an express grant of power to the
4
federal government to regulate navigation."
In comparing Congress's power to regulate navigation with its
power to collect taxes, Chief Justice Marshall noted that it is possible for both the states and the federal government to have the
power to tax, since that power is "indispensable to their existence."" 5 When states impose taxes, explained the Court, they are
not exercising a power specifically granted to Congress.", However, when a state regulates commerce, it is acting in an area
where the Constitution has specifically empowered the federal gov108.

Id. at 433.

109.

McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 433. The Court concluded that the Maryland statute

impos-

ing a tax on the federal bank was "unconstitutional and void." Id. at 436.
110.
111.

22 U.S. 1 (1824).
Id. at 239-40.

112. Id. at 190. The majority stated:
The power over commerce, including navigation, was one of the primary objects for
which the people of America adopted their government, and must have been contemplated in forming it. The convention must have used the word [commerce] in that
sense [to include navigation], because all have understood it in that sense; and the
attempt to restrict it comes too late.
Id.
113. Id. at 191. The Court also stated that its conclusion was supported by "the universally acknowledged power of the government to impose embargoes," noting that not all
embargoes are related to war. Id.
114. Id. at 193.
115. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 199.
116. Id.
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ernment to act."7
The Gibbons Court was persuaded by the appellant's argument
that the power to regulate is the power to produce a uniform system of regulation, which would be disturbed by upholding state
laws governing the same matter.118 The majority concluded that
when a state law and an act of Congress collide, the state law must
yield to the legislation passed by Congress, regardless of the
authority under which the state law was passed." 9 The framers
foresaw just such a situation, reasoned the Court, and provided for
it by expressly stating in the Constitution that the Constitution and
laws passed pursuant to the Constitution are the supreme law of
120
the land.
Justice Johnson, in a separate opinion, agreed that the power to
regulate commerce can be held by either the states or the federal
government, but not by both.'2 ' He pointed out, however, that a
grant of power is not a complete relinquishment of power unless
and until the body on which that power has been conferred takes
action that indicates acceptance of the grant.'2
Congress acted in 1838123 and 1843124 to regulate the maritime
117. Id. at 199-200.
118. Id. at 209. The appellant argued:
[A]s the word "to regulate" implies in its nature, full power over the thing to be regulated, it excludes, necessarily, the action of all others that would perform the same
operation on the same thing. That regulation is designed for the entire result, applying
to those parts which remain as they were, as well as to those which are altered. It
produces a uniform whole, which is as much disturbed and deranged by changing
what the regulating power designs to leave untouched, as that on which it has operated.
Id.
119. Id. at 210.
120. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 211.
121. Id. at 227. Justice Johnson stated:
The power of a sovereign state over commerce, therefore, amounts to nothing more
than a power to limit and restrain it at pleasure. And since the power to prescribe the
limits to its freedom, necessarily implies the power to determine what shall remain
unrestrained, it follows, that the power must be exclusive; it can reside but in one
potentate; and hence, the grant of this power carries with it the whole subject, leaving
nothing for the State to act upon.
Id.
122. Id. at 234. Justice Johnson said:
[Alithough one grant of power over commerce, should not be deemed a total relinquishment of power over the subject, but amounting only to a power to assume, still
the power of the State must be at an end, so far as the United States have, by their
legislative act, taken the subject under their immediate superintendence.
Id.
123.
124.

Act of July 7, 1838, ch. 191, 5 Stat. 304 (repealed 1781).
Act of March 3, 1843, ch. 94, 5 Stat. 626 (repealed 1781).
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transportation not only of goods, but also of passengers. The Act of
July 7, 1838, required all vessels propelled by steam to be
licensed, 125 and provided for inspection of the boilers, machinery,
and hull of licensed ships. 126 The Act of March 3, 1843, required
steam-powered vessels to be equipped with an automatic steering
mechanism, 127 and with chains to work the rudder in case the ropes
normally employed in the same capacity should be rendered use28
less because of fire.
In contrast to its decision in Gibbons (requiring state law to yield
to contrary federal law), the Supreme Court upheld state regulation
of vessels in Cooley v. Board of Wardens,129 concluding that Congressional legislation pursuant to a constitutional grant of regulatory power may indicate an intent not to exercise that power.130 In
Cooley, a Pennsylvania statute required ships traveling to or from
ports in the Delaware River and weighing seventy-five tons or more
to employ a pilot.' 31 Those vessels failing to do so were required to
forfeit half the pilotage fee. 32 Cooley failed to take a pilot and was
required to pay half the pilotage fee.'-" He brought suit to recover
his money, arguing that the statute violated the Constitution.'3
Justice Curtis, writing for the majority, noted that the propriety
of pilotage requirements is apparent from the number of states that
have enacted such regulations.'3 He concluded that. the exclusion
of some vessels does not indicate a purpose other than regulation
of pilotage,'3 and that the penalty for failing to hire a pilot is not
an impost or duty imposed in violation of the federal taxing
125. Act of July 7, 1838, ch. 191, § 1, 5 Stat 304 (repealed 1781).
126. Id. at §§ 3-4.
127. Act of March 3, 1843, ch. 94, § 1, 5 Stat. 626 (repealed 1781) provided that:
[Elvery boat or vessel which existing laws require to be registered, and which is propelled in whole or in part by steam, shall be provided with such additional apparatus
or means as ... shall be requisite to steer the boat or vessel ... in case the pilot or
man at the wheel is driven from the same by fire.
Id.
128. Id. at § 2.
129. 53 U.S. 299 (1851).
130. Id. at 320.
131. Id. at 311.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 300.
134. Cooley, 53 U.S. at 300. Cooley alleged that the Pennsylvania statute ran counter to
Art I, § 10, cl. 2 and cl. 3 of the Constitution, Art. I, § 9, cl. 5 of the Constitution, and Art. I,
§ 8, cl. 3 of the Constitution. Id. at 313-15.
135. Id. at 315.
136. Id. at 313.
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power. 137 The majority further stated that the necessity of enacting
pilotage requirements specific to each port and the inadequacy of a
uniform law are proof that the statute in question is not a violation
of the power granted to the federal government. 138
The Cooley Court acknowledged that "the power to regulate commerce includes the regulation of navigation."' 39 The regulation of

pilots, noted the Court, is a regulation of navigation and therefore
of commerce within the meaning of Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of

the Constitution. 4 0 Further, the power to regulate navigation is the
power to regulate every part of a voyage.' 4' This analysis brought

the Court to the question of whether the constitutional grant to
Congress of the power to regulate commerce "did per se deprive
142
the States of all power to regulate pilots."

The Cooley majority first noted that the constitutional grant does
not expressly deprive the states of the power to regulate all aspects
of commerce."t 3 If the states have lost their power, therefore, it
must be because the power to regulate commerce can exist in only
one governmental body.' 44 Next, the Court stated that the power to
regulate commerce is the power to control a wide variety of fac-

tors, some of which call for a uniform rule and some of which call
for diverse local rules to accommodate local needs.

45

The Court

concluded that those factors calling for a uniform rule may be regulated only by Congress, but that pilotage is not one of those factors. 146 Pilotage, rather, is best governed by local regulations. 47 Jus137. Id. The Court stated:
Imposts and duties on imports, exports, and tonnage were then known to the commerce of a civilized world to be as distinct from fees and charges for pilotage, and
from the penalties by which commercial States enforced their pilot-laws, as they were
from charges for wharfage or towage, or any other local port-charges for services rendered to vessels or cargoes.
Id. at 314.
138. Id. at 314. The majority reasoned, "it cannot be supposed uniformity was required,
when it must have been known to be impracticable." Id.
139. Cooley, 53 U.S. at 315.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 316.
142. Id. at 318.
143. Id.
144. Cooley, 53 U.S. at 318. The Court stated, "If they are excluded it must be because
the nature of the power, thus granted to Congress, requires that a similar authority should
not exist in the States." Id. This reasoning is consistent with Justice Johnson's dissenting
opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 227 (1824).
145. Id. at 319. The Court does not enumerate the components of the field of commerce, but only states, "the power to regulate commerce, embraces a vast field, containing
not only many, but exceedingly various subjects, quite unlike in their nature." Id.
146. Id. The Court stated:
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tice Curtis stated that it was the understanding of Congress "at the
outset of the government that the nature of this subject is not such
as to require its exclusive legislation." 14 The Court concluded that
"the nature of the subject" is such as to make varying local regula49
tions an "absolute necessity."
The Court, however, declined to uphold a state law regulating
registration of ships in Sinnot v. Davenport. In Sinnot, an Alabama statute required the owners of steamboats to register the vessel's name, as well as that of the owner, with the probate judge
before navigating state waters. 151 Failure to register resulted in
imposition of a $500 fme." 2 The commissioners of pilotage brought
suit against a vessel owner who had failed to register."5 The vessel
owner argued that the state law conflicted with the commerce
power of Congress, lM relying on the Act of February 17, 1793,
which required the licensing "of vessels engaged in the coasting
5
trade.""
Justice Nelson noted that the Court had held in Gibbons"5 that
vessels licensed under the Act of February 17, 1793, had full
authority to carry on the coasting trade. 157 Further, the presence of
federal legislation means that the state, in passing its own statute
on the same matter, has acted in an area already regulated by Congress."' Justice Nelson concluded that where, as here, state law
and federal law conflict with each other, the state law must yield
Whatever subjects of this power are in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature as to
require exclusive legislation by Congress. That this cannot be affirmed of laws for the
regulation of pilots and pilotage is plain.
Id.
147.

Id.

148. Id. at 320.
149. Cooley, 53 U.S. at 320.
150. 63 U.S. 227 (1859).
151. Sinnot, 63 U.S. at 238.
152. Id. at 238-39.
153. Id. at 238.
154. Id. at 239. The owner argued that:
[T]he statute of the Legislature of the State of Alabama is unconstitutional and void, it
being in conflict with that clause in the Constitution which confers upon Congress the
power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States," and
the acts of Congress passed in pursuance thereof.
Id.
155.

Id.

156.
157.
158.

22 U.S. 1 (1824).
Sinnot, 63 U.S. at 239-40.
Id. at 242.
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to the federal law.159
The Sinnot Court cautioned that federal law may only supersede
state law when the two are in direct conflict and when the federal
law was passed pursuant to a clear grant of power under the Constitution.16 In Sinnot, the act of Congress was passed pursuant to
its power to regulate commerce, which includes the power to regulate navigation.' 6' The state law, which attempted to regulate navigation, was inconsistent with the act of Congress, concluded the
Court, and was therefore invalid. 162
Federal regulation of navigation was expanded twelve years after
Sinnot, when Congress passed legislation "to provide for the better
Security of Life on board of Vessels propelled in Whole or in Part
by Steam."'63 Under Section One of the Act of February 28, 1871,
no license could be granted to any vessel unless and until all provisions of the act had been met. 16 Section Fourteen provided for the
licensing of "captains, chief mates, engineers, and pilots of all
steam-vessels," and required all steam vessels to have a "full complement of officers and crew" before leaving port.'5 Section Fortyone extended the Act to "all steamers navigating the lakes, bays,
inlets, sounds, rivers, harbors, or other navigable waters of the
United States, when such waters are common highways of commerce."l6
Section Fifty-one provided that all vessels navigating the Great
Lakes or the coasts of the United States are subject to the navigation laws of the United States, and that all vessels subject to the
navigation laws of the United States must be controlled by pilots
licensed under the Act. 167 In addition, Section Fifty-one prohibited
any state from requiring a pilot licensed under the Act to also
159. Id. at 243. "In every such case, the act of Congress or treaty is supreme; and the
law of the State . . . must yield to it." Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Sinnot, 63 U.S. at 244.
163. Act of February 28, 1871, ch. 100, 16 Stat. 440.
164. Id. In addition to the provisions discussed, the Act also required vessels to be
equipped with means to extinguish fires, forbade vessels carrying passengers from also carrying flammable liquids unless there was no other practical means for transporting the liquid,
mandated the availability of at least one lifeboat for the vessel and one life preserver per
passenger, and called for yearly inspections of the hulls and boilers of all vessels covered by
the Act. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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become licensed under state law.1 88
It was not a pilotage regulation but rather one creating a lien on
vessels that was at issue in The Roanoke.169 The State of Washington enacted a law stating that all vessels were liable for "work
done or material furnished in this State for their construction,
repair, or equipment." 17 0 The law provided that demands for work
done or material furnished constituted liens upon the vessels that
were to remain in effect for three years from the date of accrual of
a cause of action. 171 Liens could be enforced by a suit in admiralty
or by civil suit in a district court.'72 The Roanoke was owned by an
Illinois corporation and was registered in Chicago but was engaged
in trade along the Pacific coast. 17 The owner brought suit to challenge the application of the Washington law to foreign vessels. 174
Justice Brown began by pointing out that the master of a ship is
an agent of the ship's owner, and as such has full authority "to provide for the crew, and for the preservation and repair of the
ship." 175 The master's responsibilities, therefore, are such that it is
difficult if not impossible for him to become familiar with the laws
of each state. 176 This difficulty is remedied by application of "the
general maritime law . . . unhampered by laws which are mainly
intended for local application, or for domestic vessels." 177 The
Court found authority for its position in the opinion of Justice
Story in The Chusan,178 which stated that the Constitution and laws
of the United States, rather than local laws, governed cases involving foreign ships.' 79
168. Act of February 28, 1871, ch. 100, 16 Stat. 440. "And no State or municipal government shall impose upon pilots of steam-vessels herein provided for any obligation to procure
a State or other license in addition to that issued by the United States[.]" Id.
169. 189 U.S. 185 (1903).
170. The Roanoke, 189 U.S. at 193.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 194. The Court noted that, "[tihe Roanoke was an ocean-going vessel, registered at Chicago under the navigation laws of the United States . . . although she was
engaged in trade upon the Pacific coast between Seattle and the mouth of the Yukon in summer, and between San Francisco and southern ports in winter." Id.
174. Id. "The question involved in this case ... is whether the States may create such
liens as against foreign vessels (vessels owned in other States or countries)." Id.
175. The Roanoke, 189 U.S. at 195.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. 5 FCas. 680 (C.C.D. Mass. 1843) (No. 2,717).
I
179. The Roanoke, 189 U.S. at 196. "'[ ln cases of foreign ships, and supplies furnished
to them, the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States is governed by the Constitution
and laws of the United States, and is, in no sense governed, controlled, or limited by the
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The majority also stated that when Congress legislates on a subject within its exclusive power, or when exclusive power "is given
to the Federal courts," states may not legislate on that subject.180
Indeed, the majority said that concurrent state legislation would
only result in endless confusion.'"' The Court concluded that since
interstate commerce is heavily regulated by Congress, state legislation on the same subject is superseded and prohibited unless Congress clearly expresses its intent that a matter be regulated by the
states.18 2 A corollary to this conclusion is that when Congress only
acts "incidentally, and obviously with no intention of covering the
subject," state legislation is appropriate to supplement the laws
passed by Congress.s"
Congress amended its admiralty legislation to specifically include
oil tankers when it passed the Tank Vessel Act of 193 6 .is4 The Act
brought all vessels carrying "inflammable or combustible liquid
cargo" within the definition of "steam vessels" for purposes of the
Act, with the exception of vessels carrying combustible liquids only
for use as fuel.1ss The purpose of the Act was to ensure against oil
spills by providing for the promulgation of rules and regulations
pertaining to the design of tank vessels.186 In addition, the Act provided for regulation of the operation and manning of tank vessels,
as well as the qualifications of the officers and crew of tank ves87
sels.1
In contrast to cases like Cooley and Sinnot that dealt with state
vessel regulations that encroached on an area traditionally regulated by Congress, Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. involved a situation where Congress regulated in an area traditionally regulated by
the states.lss Rice was a grain dealer and a customer of the Santa
local legislation.'" Id. (quoting The Chusan, 5 FCas. 680 (C.C.D. Mass. 1843) (No. 2,717)).
180. Id. at 197.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 198.
184. 49 Stat. 1889 (1936) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 46 U.S.C.).
185. Id. The Act states, "this section shall not apply to vessels having on board only
inflammable or combustible liquid for use as fuel or stores." Id.
186. Id. The Act stated:
In order to secure effective provision against the hazards of life and property created
by the vessels to which this section applies, the Board of Supervising Inspectors ...
shall establish such additional rules and regulations as may be necessary with respect
to the design and construction, alteration, or repair of such vessels[.]
Id.
187. Id.
188. 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
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Fe Elevator Corporation. 8 9 He brought suit against Santa Fe, alleging that the corporation maintained unjust and unreasonable rates;
engaged in rate discrimination; operated without a state license;
and mixed public grain with different grades of grain, all in violation of the Illinois Public Utilities Act, the Grain Warehouse Act,
and the Illinois Constitution of 1870.190 Santa Fe moved to dismiss
the complaint, stating that the United States Warehouse Act superseded any otherwise applicable Illinois law.191 The motion was
denied, and, upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit held that the state regulations were superseded. 192 The Supreme Court granted certiorari "because of the pub93
lic importance of the questions presented."
Justice Douglas first noted that as originally enacted, the United
States Warehouse Act'14 declared that state regulations in that area
were to be superior to federal regulations. 9 5 A subsequent amendment to the Act made the Act the exclusive authority in its field.'9
Thus, concluded the Court, the Act constituted federal regulation in
an area traditionally regulated by the states. 97
Further, the majority stated that when Congress legislates in an
area traditionally regulated by the states, there is a presumption
that the existing state regulations will not be superseded unless
Congress clearly states that the federal legislation is to have preemptive effect. 198 Pre-emptive effect can be indicated by enactment
of a pervasive scheme of federal regulation, by regulations
"touch[ing] a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that
the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of
state laws on the same subject," or by a federal objective inconsis189. Rice, 331 U.S. at 220.
190. Id. at 220-22.
191. Id. at 222.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. 39 Stat. 486 (1916).
195. Rice, 331 U.S. at 222.
196. Id. at 223. Justice Douglas stated:
[Alithough the Secretary of Agriculture "is authorized to cooperate with State officials
charged with the enforcement of State laws relating to warehouses . . .the power,
jurisdiction, and authority conferred upon the Secretary of Agriculture under this Act
shall be exclusive with respect to all persons securing a license hereunder so long as
said license remains in effect."
Id. (quoting the United States Warehouse Act, 46 Stat. 1463 (1931)).
197. Id. at 230.
198. Id. Justice Douglas stated, "we start with the assumption that the historic police
powers of the States were not to be su erseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress." Id.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 39:865

tent with state policy. 199 In some cases, Justice Douglas noted,
"Congress can act so unequivocally as to make clear that it intends
no regulation except its own." 2°° The ultimate test of pre-emption
stated by the Rice majority is whether the matter regulated by the
state is regulated in any way by federal legislation. 01 Applying that
test to the Illinois Public Utilities Act and the Illinois Grain Warehouse Act, the Court concluded that both statutes were pre-empted
by the United States Warehouse Act with respect to rates; rate discrimination; use of warehousemen; mixing and loading of grain;
storage charges; elevator maintenance; state licensing; abandonment of services; and publication of rate schedules. 2 2 Illinois law
was not pre-empted by federal law on the matters of contract
approval, lease approval, and approval for issuance of securities,
because "[t]he United States Warehouse Act contains no provisions
20 3
relating expressly to these three matters."
Justice Frankfurter dissented, stating that the test announced by
the majority would result in pre-emption "if Congress has touched
a subject matter . . . though there is neither paper nor operating
conflict between Federal and State spheres of authority."2°4 A better
rule, said Justice Frankfurter, would be to pre-empt state laws only
when Congress clearly has removed all authority from the states, or
205
when state and federal law are clearly in conflict.
Both the test announced by the Rice majority (existence of federal legislation) and that proposed by Justice Frankfurter's dissent
in Rice (federal legislation that clearly takes all power away from
the states) seem to be fulfilled by the Ports and Waterways Safety
Act of 1972 ("PWSA'), as amended by the Port and Tanker Safety

Act of

1978.206

The PWSA states that "navigation and vessel safety

and protection of the marine environment are matters of major
national importance" and so call for "increased supervision of vessel and port operations." 0 7 The Secretary of the department con199. Id.
200. Rice, 331 U.S. at 236.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 224-30.
203. Id. at 237.
204. Id. at 242.
205. Rice, 331 U.S. at 241. "[D]ue regard for our federalism. . . favors survival of the
reserved authority of a State over matters that are the intimate concern of the State unless
Congress has clearly swept the boards of all State authority, or the State's claim is in unmistakable conflict with what Congress has ordered." Id.
206. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-36 (1994).
207. Id. at § 1221.
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taining the Coast Guard20 8 has the power, under the PWSA, to create vessel traffic services and require vessels to comply with those
services; 2°9 to require vessels to use certain navigation and communications equipment; to control vessel traffic in hazardous areas;
and to "require the receipt of pre-arrival messages" from vessels
destined for United States ports. 210 The PWSA also gives the Secretary the authority to designate traffic patterns for vessels to follow
when traveling to and from United States ports. 211 In promulgating
regulations under the PWSA, the Secretary is to consider all relevant factors, including local variations in "geography, climate, and
other similar factors," as well as "local practices and customs,
including voluntary arrangements and agreements within the mari212
time community."
The PWSA also sets forth conditions prerequisite to entry into
the navigable waters of the United States. 2 3 Vessels will be admitted into United States waters only if they comply with regulations
issued under the PWSA or under 46 U.S.C. §§ 3701-19,214 if they are
"manned in compliance with [necessary] manning levels," and if
they have at least one deck officer "capable of clearly understanding English." 215 Finally, the PWSA sets forth the applicable civil and
criminal penalties for violations of the PWSA or a regulation issued
208. Id. at § 1222.
209. Id. at § 1223. The secretary:
may construct, operate, maintain, improve, or expand vessel traffic services, consisting of measures for controlling or supervising vessel traffic or for protecting navigation and the marine environment and may include, but need not be limited to one or
more of the following: reporting and operating requirements, surveillance and communication systems, routing systems, and fairways[.]
Id.
210. Id.
211. 33 U.S.C. at § 1223. "[Tlhe Secretary shall designate necessary fairways and traffic
separation schemes for vessels operating in the territorial sea of the United States and in
high seas approaches, outside the territorial sea, to. . . ports or places" subject to United
States jurisdiction. Id.
212. Id. at § 1224.
213. Id. at § 1228.
214. 46 U.S.C. §§ 3701-19 (1994). The regulations authorized by Chapter Thirty-seven
relate to "the design, construction, alteration, repair, maintenance, operation, equipping, personnel qualification, and manning of vessels. .. that may be necessary for increased protection against hazards to life and property, for navigation and vessel safety, and for enhanced
protection of the marine environment." Id. at § 3703.
215. 33 U.S.C. § 1228 (1994). Other conditions set forth in § 1228 include lack of history of "accidents, pollution incidents, or serious repair problems," lack of previous spills of
oil or other hazardous substances, compliance with "applicable vessel traffic service requirements," and manning by officers licensed by a state with licensing standards as strict or
stricter than those imposed or agreed to by the United States. Id.
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pursuant to the PWSA. 216
The United States Supreme Court addressed the provisions of the
PWSA and their effect on state law in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield
Co.217 In Ray, Atlantic Richfield brought suit to enjoin enforcement
of a Washington state statute that Atlantic Richfield alleged to be
pre-empted by the PWSA.218 The district court ruled that all of the
provisions of the Washington statute were pre-empted and enjoined
the State of Washington from enforcing the statute.2 9 The Supreme
Court invalidated the Washington statutes relating to pilotage,
safety features, and the size and speed of vessels, 220 but upheld the
22
Washington tug-escort requirement. '
Justice White, writing for the majority, began with the assumption stated in Rice that "'the historic police powers of the States
[are] not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress.' "222 Justice White further
stated, however, that even if Congress has not prohibited state legislation in an area of law, a state statute cannot stand if it is in
direct conflict with federal legislation.223 State and federal laws are
in direct conflict when compliance with both is physically impossible, or when compliance with the state law makes it impossible to
achieve federal goals. 224 The Court then addressed each of the
Washington statutes at issue. 225
First, Washington Revised Code section 88.16.180 required "both
enrolled and registered oil tankers of at least 50,000 [deadweight
216. Id. at § 1232. Civil penalties are not to exceed $25,000 per violation. Willful and
knowing violation of the PWSA is a class D felony, and willful and knowing violation coupled with use of a dangerous weapon or bodily injury to an officer authorized to enforce the
PWSA is a class C felony. Id.
217. 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
218. Id. at 156. The statutes at issue required certain tankers "to take on a pilot
licensed by the State of Washington while navigating Puget Sound," to possess enumerated
safety features such as double hulls and two working radars, and excluded vessels in excess
of 125,000 deadweight tons. Id. at 158, 160, and 173.
219. Id. at 156.
220. Id. at 158-59, 165, and 175.
221. Id. at 168-69.
222. Ray, 435 U.S. at 157 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Co., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947)).
223. Id. at 158.
224. Id. "A conflict will be found 'where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,' or where the state 'law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'" Id. (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963), Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941), and Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977)).
225. Id.
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tons] to take on a pilot licensed by the State of Washington while
navigating Puget Sound."26 The majority concluded that this statute
was in direct conflict with 46 U.S.C. §§ 215 and 364.227 These two
sections, declared the Court, "give the Federal Government exclusive authority to regulate pilots on enrolled vessels and . . . pre-

clude a State from imposing its own pilotage requirements ..

.. "228

Next, Justice White discussed Washington Revised Code section
88.16.190(2), which mandated certain safety features that must be
possessed by all vessels between 40,000 and 125,000 deadweight
tons. 229 According to the statute, if a vessel has a tug escort, it need
not possess the listed features.m The Court stated that Title II of
the PWSA, which amended the Tank Vessel Act of 1936, provides
the law relevant to a pre-emption analysis of section 88.16.190(2).231
Justice White noted that the goals of Title II are vessel safety and
protection of the marine environment2 2 These goals are to be
implemented by the Secretary's promulgation of necessary rules
and regulations. 23 Title H also provides for inspection of vessels to
ensure compliance with the regulations enacted.2- The majority
understood these provisions of Title II to indicate a Congressional
intent to establish uniform national standards for tanker design and
construction.23 Further, the Court noted that the goals of the
PWSA are the same as the goals of section 88.16.190(2).2 The
Court concluded that, since the state law and the federal law conflict, the state law could not stand.27 Justice White also pointed out
226. Id.
227. Ray, 435 U.S. at 158. Section 364 requires steam vessels to be under the control of
pilots licensed by the Coast Guard, and Section 215 prohibits state and municipal governments from requiring pilots to obtain a state license in addition to the Coast Guard license.
Id. at 158-59.
228. Id. at 159.
229. Id. at 160. The features required are a horsepower ratio of one horsepower to
each two and a half deadweight tons, twin screws, double bottoms, two working radar systems, and other navigational systems prescribed by the board of pilotage commissioners. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 161.
232. Ray, 435 U.S. at 161.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 162.
235. Id. at 163. "This indicates to us that Congress intended uniform national standards
for design and construction of tankers that would foreclose the imposition of different or
more stringent state requirements." Id.
236. Id. at 165.
237. Ray, 435 U.S. at 165. "The Supremacy Clause dictates that the federal judgment
that a vessel is safe to navigate the United States waters prevails over the contrary state
judgment." Id.
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that state regulation in this area "would frustrate the Congressional
desire of achieving uniform, international standards," and therefore
is an obstacle to achieving the goals of the federal statute. 2 O
Although the Court invalidated Washington's design requirements
under section 88.16.190(2), it allowed the tug-escort requirement to
stand.239 The majority based this part of its decision on Title I of
the PWSA, which allows the Secretary to enact a system to regulate
vessel traffic. 240 When issuing rules and regulations, the Secretary is
required to consider a number of factors, including the environmental impact of the regulations, the severity of the hazards involved,
and characteristics of vessel traffic. 241 The Court concluded that the
tug-escort requirement was an operating rule such as those permitted to be promulgated by the Secretary under Title 1.242 However,
Title I only permits and does not require the Secretary to issue regulations, explained the majority, and therefore the question must be
decided by inquiring whether the Secretary had issued any regulation comparable to the one promulgated by the State of Washing2
ton. 43

Justice White noted that the Secretary had neither promulgated
any regulation nor concluded that a regulation was not necessary,
but had issued a notice of proposed rulemaking indicating intent to
amend existing regulations "to require tug escorts for certain vessels operating in confined waters." 244 The Court stated that lack of
existing federal regulations indicates that there is no federal rule to
2 5
pre-empt the state rule, and the state rule may stand. "
Finally, the Court considered the effect of federal legislation on
the Washington statute prohibiting vessels in excess of 125,000
deadweight tons from entering Puget Sound. 246 Under the PWSA,
the Secretary may impose "vessel size and speed limitations." 247 The
majority concluded that this express delegation of authority over
vessels, along with the reservation in Section 1222(b) of state pow238. Id. at 168.
239. Id. at 168-69.
240. Id. at 169. Permissible means of traffic regulation include "specifying the times for
vessel movement," "establishing size and speed regulations and vessel operating conditions,"
imposing a pilotage requirement, and establishing "waterfront safety zones." Id. at 169-70.
241. Id. at 170.
242. Ray, 435 U.S. at 171.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 172.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 173.
247. Ray, 435 U.S. at 174.
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ers to impose higher standards on "structures only," implies that
states may not impose "higher . . . standards for vessels."218 The
Court also concluded that the Secretary had acted with respect to
vessel size limitations by enacting a regulation that prohibits more
than one vessel in excess of 70,000 deadweight tons from traversing Rosario Strait at any given time.249 Since the Secretary has
acted to determine when the size of a vessel limits its ability to
navigate Puget Sound, declared the Court, "the State may not
impose higher safety standards." 25° Accordingly, the Court held that
251
"the size limitation of § 88.16.190(1) may not be enforced."
Justice Marshall's dissent argued that Title I did not "pre-empt all
state regulation of vessel size" because it permitted but did not
require issuance of federal regulations.252 Rather than completely
invalidating the Washington laws, stated Justice Marshall, the Court
should invalidate only those laws that obstruct achievement of the
federal regulations' goals and should "reconcile" the remaining state
and federal laws with each other.25 6 The dissent also noted that the
PWSA requires the Secretary to consider the existence of local
traffic-control regulations when deciding whether federal regulations should be imposed.254 Finally, Justice Marshall stated that
local regulations on tanker access are "appropriate, and perhaps
even necessary," because water depth and other conditions vary
26
from one port to another.
Justice Stevens also dissented in Ray.2 6 While he agreed that the
PWSA prohibited the State of Washington from enacting vessel size
limitations, he believed that the state also could not impose a tug248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 175.
251. Id.
252. Ray, 435 U.S. at 182 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan and then-Justice
Rehnquist joined in Justice Marshall's dissent. Id. at 180.
253. Id. at 182-83 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall stated:
The Court concludes that the Secretary's delegate, the Coast Guard, has in fact considered the issue of size limitations for Puget Sound and reached a judgment contrary to
the one embodied in the Tlanker Law. Under well-established principles, however, state
law should be displaced "'only to the extent necessary to protect the achievement of
the aims of'" federal law; whenever possible, we should "reconcile 'the operation of
both statutory schemes with one another rather than holding [the state scheme] completely ousted.'"
Id. (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973)).
254. Id. at 184 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
255. Id. at 186 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
256. Id. at 187 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Powell joined in Justice Stevens's opinion. Id.
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escort requirement on vessels of a certain size. 25 7 Justice Stevens
concluded that since federal interests prohibited states from legislating on the matter of vessel size, those same interests also prohibited states from imposing a penalty for violation of vessel-size regu2
lations. 5
Eleven years after the Court's decision in Ray, the Exxon Valdez
ran aground in Prince William Sound, Alaska, 259 spilling more than
eleven million gallons of oil26° and prompting Congress to enact the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990.261 The language of the Oil Pollution Act of
1990 ("OPA') does not explicitly prohibit the states from imposing
additional liability for oil spills into or upon the navigable waters of
the United States. 262 Under the OPA, each party responsible for a
vessel that discharges or threatens to discharge oil is liable for "the
263
removal costs and damages . . . that result from such incident."
The section of the OPA entitled "Relationship to other law" 264 provides that nothing in the OPA shall affect the ability of states to
impose additional liability for or requirements relating to oil spills
or removal activities. 265 The same section also provides that nothing
in the OPA shall affect the ability of states to impose additional liability or requirements, or to impose additional fines for violation of
any law related to an oil spill or the threat of an oil spill.26 These
257. Ray, 435 U.S. at 188 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
258. Id. at 189 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "The federal interest that prohibits state
enforcement of those requirements should also prohibit state enforcement of a special penalty for failure to comply with them." Id.
259. Locke, 120 S. Ct. at 1140.
260. Id. at 1142.
261. Id. at 1144.
262. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-61 (1994).
263. 33 U.S.C. § 2702 (1994). Damages include injury to natural resources-and real or
personal property, loss of subsistence use of natural resources, loss of revenues, and cost of
necessary public services during removal activities. Id. Liability imposed on tank vessels is
limited to the greater of $1,200 per gross ton, or $10,000,000 in the case of vessels greater
than 3,000 gross tons or $2,000,000 in the case of vessels less than 3,000 gross tons; liability
on all other vessels is limited to the greater of $600 per gross ton or $500,000. 33 U.S.C. §
2704 (1994).
264. 33 U.S.C. § 2718 (1994).
265. Id. 33 U.S.C. § 2718(a) (1994) provides:
Nothing in this Act or the Act of March 3, 1851 shall - (1) affect, or be construed or
interpreted as preempting, the authority of any State or political subdivision thereof
from imposing any additional liability or requirements with respect to - (A) the discharge of oil or other pollution by oil within such State; or (B) any removal activities
in connection with such a discharge[.]
Id.
266. Id. 33 U.S.C. § 2718(c) (1994) provides:
Nothing in this Act, the Act of March 3, 1851 ... or section 9509 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 ... shall in any way affect, or be construed to affect, the authority
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are the two savings clauses relied on in the Court's opinion in
Locke.2 7
The Court's conclusion in Locke is consistent with both the history of federal regulation of navigation and the principles of preemption. With each new law passed by Congress, the scope of federal regulation of navigation expands, and the sphere of permissible
state control contracts. Pervasive federal regulations aimed at a
uniform body of law are necessary, however, to ensure the safety
of humans and the environment. To allow each state to enact its
own navigation rules "would promote confusion and inefficiency
rather than safety."268
The response of the State of Washington following announcement
of the Court's opinion also supports the conclusion that the Court's
decision is correct. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the
Ninth Circuit. 269 Before the Ninth Circuit could hear arguments

regarding pre-emption of the remaining Washington statutes, Washington repealed the regulations at issue.270 Repeal of the regulations
seems to be a concession on the part of the State of Washington
that its regulations destroyed the uniformity of the federal scheme
and that a uniform system of regulation is the best way to promote
both vessel and environmental safety.
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Locke does leave some room for
state regulations, so long as those regulations pertain to the peculiarities of local waterways and do not conflict with federal regulations.271 Allowing states to pass regulations pertaining to some
areas of navigation but not to others may seem to be inconsistent
with a uniform system of federal regulation, but this does not
destroy the uniformity of the federal scheme. The overall goal of
tanker regulations is to promote safety and thereby avoid costly oil
spills. The federal scheme achieves that goal by ensuring that
tanker regulations do not vary from state to state. State laws dealof the United States or any State or political subdivision thereof - (1) to impose additional liability or additional requirements; or (2) to impose, or to determine the
for any violation of law; relating to the discharge,
amount of, any fine or penalty
or substantial threat of a discharge, of oil.
Id.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
Supreme
Likely to

Locke, 120 S. Ct. at 1145.
Tankers and Safety, J. Con_, Mar. 13, 2000, at 6.
Locke, 120 S. Ct. at 1152.
Intertanko v. Locke, 216 E3d 880 (9th Cir. 2000).
John McLaughlin, Insight: Supreme Win But Battle Not Over: Intertanko's U.S.
Court Victory Is a Welcome Boost for Battered Tanker Owners with the Case
Be a Legal Benchmark for Years to Come, LLOYD's LIST INT'L, Mar. 13, 2000, at 7.
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ing with especially hazardous features of local waters achieve that
goal by bringing localized dangers to the attention of a vessel's
officers and crew. Rather than creating a different complex of regulations with which a vessel must comply, local regulations dealing
only with local peculiarities serve as an overlay on the federal laws
that constitute the bulk of applicable regulations. The same basic
regulations still apply, but one or more additional regulations may
be added because of a threat to vessel safety that exists only in
certain waters. A comprehensive federal scheme of regulation
enhanced by state laws emphasizing local conditions is, both practically and economically, the most efficient way to prevent the environmental catastrophe that is latent in every shipment of oil by sea.
Elizabeth A. Rosso

